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Professor Glazer offers us, in Sexual Reorientation, an appealing and intui~ 
tive way to deal with the difficulty of bisexual identity, an identity that has 
always fit uneasily and sometimes quite unhappily in the LGBT rights move-
ment. If the principal problem of bisexuality is its very temporal changeability, 
its tendency to dissolve into heterosexuality or homosexuality depending on the 
gender of one's sexual partner, then Glazer's solution is elegant. She proposes 
that we bifurcate (so to speak) sexual orientation into two subcategories and 
acknowledge for everyone both a general and a specific orientation. General 
orientation "is the sex toward which the individual is attracted as a general 
matter," 1 while specific orientation is determined by the sex of the individual's 
current partner. 2 Thus, for bisexuals and anyone whose specific coupling does 
not fall in line with how they generally understand their sexual identity, 
Glazer's sexual reorientation offers a neat way to own both a general and a 
specific identity. 
Glazer elaborates on her new categories by analogizing to two deep tensions 
in the theorizing on sexual identity: the distinctions between status and conduct 
and between individual and group rights. Glazer suggests that one's sexual 
identity has a general characteristic-a "type," as she puts it, such as someone 
who is normally attracted to women-that may or may not align with the gender 
of one's partner at any given time.3 This general orientation, or type, is 
analogous to one's sexual "status," whereas one's specific orientation recognizes 
the act or "conduct" of partnering with a specific person.4 Moreover, according 
to Glazer, one's general orientation belongs to each person as an individual 
while one's specific orientation is necessarily more relational, as it "describes 
one's sexual orientation once coupled."5 The result for Glazer is a reorientation 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.© 2012, Naomi Mezey. 
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of sexual identity that would not only overcome some of the problems presented 
by the status/conduct distinction and accommodate both individual and rela-
tional conceptions of identity, but would also provide the law with the ability to 
protect "living identities."6 
There is plenty to praise, quibble with, and critique in this formulation, but 
I'd like to focus my comments on where this reconceptualization of sexual 
orientation leads, into what sort of future it may deliver us. Glazer herself 
acknowledges that the article is primarily a discursive and categorical interven-
tion, but she claims potentially transformative results from these new catego-
ries: 
This Article's chief contribution is a set of words. Words that could have 
helped Kenji Yoshino talk to his students about sexual orientation without 
having to resort to the very binary he rejected. And words that can help the 
LGBT rights movement, legislatures, and courts protect against discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation as it is actually lived, rather than on the 
basis of sexual orientation as the law has until now imagined it to be.7 
So what do these words do, what might they mean, and where do they take 
us? I'd like to explore these questions in relation to three themes: antidiscrimina-
tion law, lived identities, and identity sabotage. First, with respect to antidiscrimi-
nation law, my instinct is that these words will not change much. Although I do 
want to acknowledge the possibility that they might provide courts a useful 
mechanism for recognizing harms specific to bisexuals, this possibility seems 
both unlikely and limited. Second, although I appreciate the way these words 
open one avenue of dynamism into the narrow and static categories we use to 
describe sexual orientation, I do not think they begin to approach the way 
sexual identity is actually lived and experienced. Finally, to the extent that part 
of the power and disruptive potential of the very category of bisexuality is in its 
ability to evade categorization, to infiltrate and sabotage the too-tidy regimes of 
heterosexuality and homosexuality, these words may do some harm. To the 
extent they prove useful to people inside and outside the law, they may also 
occasion a loss that I think is important to acknowledge-the weakening of 
queer aspirations and the death of the bisexual saboteur. 
I. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
In addition to being a reconceptualization project, Glazer's framework is also 
a bisexual-legitimation project. The reconceptualization of sexual orientation is 
meant to make bisexuality-although an undefined version of bisexuality-
more socially acceptable and more legible to legal actors, to provide legal 
protection for the discriminatory harms bisexuals suffer at the hands of both gay 
6. /d. at 1068. 
7. /d. at 1060. 
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and straight people. Glazer tends to distinguish between bi denial by straight 
people, which she terms "erasure," and bi denial by gay people, which she calls 
"hypervisibility" or "spotlighting."8 The two cases that form the basis of 
Glazer's claim that bisexuals suffer harm through hypervisibility-and which 
Glazer claims would be understood differently under her new categories-are 
the gay-softball case and the questioning of Sandy Stier during the Proposition 
8 litigation of Perry v. Schwarzenegger.9 Accepting for the moment what I take 
to be Glazer's understanding of bisexuality, 10 I'd like to consider each case to 
see what Glazer's new set of words might do. 
In the gay-softball case, a San Francisco team was forced to forfeit its 
second-place finish in the 2008 Gay Softball World Series because it was found 
to have violated a rule of the North American Gay Amateur Athletic Association 
(NAGAAA) requiring that no team have more than two heterosexuals. 11 Three 
male team members were extensively questioned by representatives of the 
NAGAAA about whether they were "predominantly attracted to men" or 
women. 12 Apparently at least one of the men responded that he was attracted to 
both men and women, because a NAGAAA representative quipped that, "This 
is the Gay World Series, not the Bisexual World Series." 13 Glazer asserts that 
her new categories would have allowed the three disqualified softball players to 
"successfully argue that the NAGAAA's prohibition on having more than two 
heterosexual team members definitively did not apply to them."14 
8. Glazer borrows "erasure" from Yoshino, whom she notes used it to describe bisexual elision by 
both gays and straights, but as the article proceeds she tends to split the terms so that erasure 
corresponds to bisexual denial by straights and spotlighting to bisexual denial by gays. See, e.g., id. at 
1044-45. Although the object was much the same, in my own work I used the Frostian metaphor of a 
wall that is "vigilantly maintained" by both gay and straight people to protect heterosexuality and 
homosexuality as coherent and mutually exclusive identity categories. Naomi Mezey, Dismantling the 
Wall: Bisexuality and the Possibilities of Sexual Identity Classification Based on Acts, 10 BERKELEY 
WoMEN's L.J. 98, 100 (1995). The actual metaphors matter less to me than the ideas they capture, and 
my point is merely that I am skeptical that the bi denial practiced by gay people as they protect the 
categorical purity of homosexuality makes bisexuals any more visible or invisible than the same bi 
denial practiced by straight people. 
9. See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1027-35, 1057. 
10. Glazer avoids defining bisexuality, but the article suggests that it may include anyone whose 
specific orientation and general orientation do not align. See id. at 1008, I 057. This clearly presents 
some problems because, according to Glazer's framework, there is no bisexual specific orientation and 
some bisexuals may have a general orientation that is gay or straight. It also raises the issue of whether 
sexual orientation is self- or other-defined. If self-defined, then bisexuality is rendered more invisible 
than it otherwise might be. For example, someone whose general sexual orientation is straight but 
whose specific orientation is not consistent with that general orientation (or vice versa) may well be 
unlikely to ever identify as bisexual. Or someone who claims a bisexual general orientation might well 
reject the binary choices of specific orientation on the theory that all their couplings are also bisexual, 
regardless of the gender of the person they couple with. 
11. Press Release, National Center for Lesbian Rights, NCLR Files Suit Challenging Discriminatory 
Athletic Policy (Apr. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nclrights.org/site!PageServer?pagename= 
press_Apilado_v_NAGAA042010. 
12. /d. 
13. /d. 
14. Glazer, supra note I, at 1057. 
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But it is not at all clear to me why this would be the case. Let's assume that 
the sexual identity interrogation conducted by the NAGAAA was more nuanced 
and allowed for the articulation of general and specific orientations. Let's also 
assume, as seems likely, that one or all of the men would have responded that 
their general orientation was bisexual. Given what we know, there is no reason 
to think such a refrarning would have changed anything. Even though it did not 
use the terms general and specific orientation, the NAGAAA clearly recognized 
the existence of bisexuality and chose to interpret it as insufficiently gay. The 
comment that it was not the Bisexual World Series seems to confirm this. Or 
suppose one of the men had said his general orientation was gay but his specific 
orientation was straight, or the other way around. Either way, it seems entirely 
likely that either claim would have been read as insufficiently gay by the 
NAGAAA. In other words, the NAGAAA did what I earlier suggested happens 
all the time: they simply recategorized--or "erased"-bisexuality in order to 
maintain hetero- and homo-categorical purity. I'm not sure why the new words 
of sexual reorientation would change this practice unless it depends on the 
further assumption that the more dynamic categories would occasion greater 
acceptance of bisexuality by gay and straight people alike. Perhaps, but this is 
both much more speculative and not a claim I take Glazer to be making. To the 
extent that the words might allow a court to use a gender-stereotyping theory to 
protect the "status" of bisexuality, this also seems quite speculative for reasons I 
address below. 
Likewise, in the Proposition 8 litigation, Perry's lawyers, in seeking to 
demonstrate that Prop 8 discriminated against people on the basis of their sexual 
orientation by not allowing them to marry, not surprisingly essentialized the 
sexual identity of their purportedly gay clients-implying they could not "choose" 
to marry someone of the opposite sex in much the same way that we assume 
someone who is straight could not choose to marry someone of the same sex. 
Like many gay rights strategists before them, Perry's lawyers hoped to rely on 
arguments from immutability. 15 In one exchange, David Boies elicited an 
explanation from one witness of what it meant to be "a natural-born gay."16 In 
this same vein, Ted Olson, on direct examination, sought to "rehabilitate" 
Perry's partner Sandy Stier-who had previously been married to a man-from 
someone who might be considered bisexual to someone who was sufficiently 
gay. During her testimony Stier admitted that she had been married to a man for 
over ten years, had loved her husband when she married him, and did not 
believe she was a lesbian at that time. 17 In response, Olson deftly elicited and 
sought to defeat the suggestion that Stier might be bisexual, proposing that 
some people might say of her sexual identity that, "it's this and then it's that and 
15. See generally Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the 
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1994). 
16. Transcript of Record at 91, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 
C 09-2292), available at http://www.afer.org/wp-content/uploads/20 10/0 1/Perry-Vol-1-1-11-1 0. pdf. 
17. ld. at 161-65. 
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it could be this again." 18 In response, Stier reassured the court (and the public) 
that although she had come to the realization that she was gay late in life, she 
was convinced she was gay because Kris Perry was the only person she had 
ever fallen in love with. 19 In essence, Stier tried to make up for the mutability of 
her sexual preferences with romance. 
Glazer contends that her new set of words would have allowed Boies and 
Olson to "skip[] the portion of their direct examinations in which they inquired 
about the stability of their clients' sexual orientations," or alternatively would 
have allowed the witnesses, despite specific orientations that were homosexual, 
to claim a general orientation anywhere "along Kinsey's continuum."20 Again, I 
am skeptical that this is true. Much like the NAGAAA's mockery and clear 
rejection of bisexuality as insufficiently gay, Boies and Olson understood that 
the politics of gay marriage required their plaintiffs to appear, in Glazer's own 
words, "straight, but for the fact that they're gay.'m Indeed, like the NAGAAA, 
Olson mocks bisexuality as malleable, changeable, and indecisive. Both the 
lawyers and their clients in Perry understood that the plaintiffs' sexual identities 
needed to fit into the narrative espoused by most gay rights activists: that gay 
people are always and authentically gay regardless of how long it might have 
taken them to realize it, and regardless of the compulsive heterosexuality they 
may have previously performed (and perhaps continue to perform). In this 
narrative, as Glazer knows, claims to bisexuality are often recast as internalized 
homophobia and denial. Nothing about the new set of words that Glazer 
proposes seems likely to change this problem. 
It may be that Glazer's claim is not that her sexual-reorientation proposal will 
by itself change the hearts and minds of those who work to maintain the 
categorical purity of homosexuality and heterosexuality, but that it will at least 
enable courts to protect bisexuals from misrecognition or recategorization by 
anyone who pursues categorical purity through the confiation of "sexual-
orientation status with sexual-orientation conduct, thereby excluding from the 
definition of 'sexual orientation' groups, like bisexuals, whose status and con-
duct are not identical.''22 Here Glazer's claim seems to be that the distinction 
between general and specific orientation can help courts apply the gender-
stereotyping theory of Price Waterhouse to sexual-orientation discrimination 
when one's sexual conduct (for example, presumably always either straight or 
gay) doesn't correspond with one's sexual status (for example, bisexuality).Z3 
This claim is both legally clever and laudable for the way it seeks remedy and 
respect for those who claim discrimination as bisexuals. 
But the claim that courts will use Glazer's framework to recognize a gender-
18. ld. at 166--67. 
19. ld. at 167. 
20. Glazer, supra note 1, at 1057-58. 
21. !d. at 1023, 1033-34. 
22. !d. at 1047. 
23. ld. at 1056-57. 
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stereotyping theory of sexual-orientation discrimination strikes me as both 
unlikely and of limited impact. It is of limited impact because it is not obvious 
how much sexual-orientation discrimination would be claimed by, or is specific 
to, bisexuals. To use Glazer's own example, it seems evident from Sandy Stier's 
testimony that she not only does not consider herself bisexual, but the harm she 
was actually complaining of (her exclusion from marriage) is not a harm 
specific to bisexuals. In other words, Stier does not seem to consider that there 
is a discrepancy between her sexual status and her sexual conduct. If that is 
right, then unlike the softball players, sexual reorientation does not appear to 
offer Stier anything she can use. 
The claim that courts will apply such a theory of sexual-orientation discrimi-
nation is also unlikely because the line of argument that gets us there relies on at 
least three unsupported assumptions. First, it assumes that one's general orienta-
tion can and should be understood unproblematically as a status claim. But will 
it be understood that way, and do we want it to be? In the realm of sexual 
orientation, "status" and "conduct" have always been contested, unstable, and 
deeply discursive categories. They are not self-executing. Even if a "status" 
claim were uncontested, it works best within antidiscrimination law when it is 
meant to convey an essentialist identity about which we have no choice. Given 
that bisexuality is rarely viewed as an essentialist status claim (indeed, one of 
the reasons it is so threatening to gays and lesbians is precisely because it 
disrupts such a claim), why would calling it one's general orientation make it 
any more likely to be understood as such? Second, the argument that Glazer's 
sexual reorientation will allow courts to better protect discrimination against 
bisexuals sometimes appears to assume that we have a minimal understanding 
of what bisexuality is and is not. 24 I am not at all sure we do have such an 
understanding?5 Lastly, Glazer's argument that these new words will do real 
work in the area of antidiscrimination law assumes that courts will in fact take 
the logic of gender stereotyping that they have found in the context of gender 
and transgender discrimination and apply it not only to sexual orientation, but to 
bisexuality, whatever that may be. It is entirely possible, but because it relies on 
an elision of legal categories (gender and sexual orientation) that do not enjoy 
equal status in antidiscrimination law, 26 as well as a set of problematic assump-
24. Although Glazer presents Yoshino's definition of the bisexual as someone whose sexual desire 
for members of each sex is more than incidental, id. at 1005, she concludes that deciding on a particular 
definition is unimportant, id. at 1007-08. She later acknowledges that "bisexual discrimination" may be 
found even when someone does not identify as bisexual, calling bisexual discrimination any discrimina-
tion based on a discrepancy between one's sexual conduct and sexual status. !d. at 1057. But this 
quickly becomes rather circular as claims to a status may rely on a claim to bisexuality. 
25. See Mezey, supra note 8, at 110-12; see also supra note 10. 
26. I appreciate Andrew Koppelman's point, in this discussion and elsewhere, that gender and sexual 
orientation should not be separate legal categories. Andrew Koppelman, Response: Sexual Disorienta-
tion, 100 GEo. L.J. 1083 (2012). But even if that is the simpler doctrinal approach, it does not track the 
preferences of most gay rights advocates, the assumptions of judges, nor the ways the law has shifted to 
accommodate claims based on gender and sexuality. 
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tions about what bisexuality and bisexual status mean, I'm not betting on it. 
II. LIVED IDENTITY 
One of the refrains throughout Glazer's article is that her reconceptualization 
of sexual orientation will provide a way to protect "the lived experience of 
human sexuality," or "living identities.'m I admit an admiration for the elegance 
and lucidity of her model and acknowledge that it allows for more dynamism 
than currently exists in our sexual-identity categories by asserting the possibility 
of an identity not fully defined by the gender of one's current partner. But 
allowing for more dynamism than currently exists in our sexual-identity catego-
ries is a very low hurdle indeed. Along with my admiration is sorrow at how 
impoverished our collective understandings of sexual identity and desire are 
that this variation on the standard sexual-orientation scheme could be seen as 
even beginning to capture lived identity. Not only are our sexual-identity 
choices sadly limited, but how, when, and why we choose them is complex and 
partially constrained. Taking into account lived identity requires consideration 
of the complexities of identity choice; I briefly address that complexity by 
looking at the processes of socialization, external identification, and interpella-
tion. 
Glazer uses a New York Magazine story about the "Cuddle Puddle" at 
Stuyvesant High School-teens who pet boys and girls alike and shun la-
bels-to suggest that a post-gay generation that calls their sexual orientation 
')ust, whatever" is insufficient to the legal and human need for categories. 28 Are 
our lived identities so circumscribed and oppressed by sexual-orientation catego-
ries that a group of teenagers getting off with each other irrespective of gender 
and identity seems outside the bounds of the law and the human?29 Can any 
new recombination of old sexual-orientation categories really get anywhere 
close to our lived experience, which I fervently hope and believe far surpasses 
the paucity of categories around which we continue to organize our self-
conceptions, social judgments, laws, and politics? 
While I deeply appreciate Glazer for momentarily retrieving my work from 
the dustbin of legal scholarship, less evident in her account of my bisexuality 
article is the way in which it fought against the relegitimation of sexual-
orientation categories and proposed a classification based on acts not as a 
revision of sexual orientation, but as a way to smoke out the many different 
forms of bisexual and even non-gender-based sexual activities and preferences 
as they are actually lived and experienced. 30 Inspired by the queer interventions 
27. E.g., Glazer, supra note 1, at 1004, 1040. 
28. /d. at 1054 (citing Alex Morris, The Cuddle Puddle of Stuyvesant High School, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 
28, 2006), http://nymag.com/news/featuresll5589/). 
29. Ruth Colker describes this problem as Glazer's inability to account for "sexual-orientation 
resisters." Rutb Colker, Response: Hybrid Revisited, 100 GEo. L.J. 1069, 1072-75 (2012). 
30. Glazer suggests tbat my argument for the elimination of sexual-orientation classification was a 
way to show that "sexual orientation is really only about acts." Glazer, supra note I, at 1043. In fact, it 
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of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, 31 I thought that perhaps talking about acts rather 
than identity would help unsettle the discursive hegemony of the hetero/homo 
regime. 32 I would have thought after all this time that the legacy of Sedgwick 
specifically and queer studies generally would have delivered us into a fuller 
understanding of sexuality as it is, and could still be, lived. 
Even if we were content to continue to organize our sexual understandings in 
the traditional ways, allowing for the reorientation Glazer suggests, what ex-
actly does it mean to claim a general and specific orientation? What does it 
mean to identify the "the sex toward which [one] is attracted the majority of the 
time"?33 How do we know what we are and when we are it? For example, I am 
in a long-term monogamous relationship with a man, and whatever else it may 
say about my own lack of imagination, what does that mean for my general 
orientation? Is it a way to describe my actual psychic or fantasy life? Is it a 
hypothetical category of whom I would consider having sex with if I were to 
have sex with other people? Is it a history of the gender choices I made in my 
past couplings?34 Nor is specific orientation self-evident. What, for example, is 
the specific orientation of a cisgendered woman who couples with a transgen-
dered man when both wish to have a queer relationship?35 
And even if we think we can identify our specific or general orientations, 
what does it mean to choose them: for whom does it matter or make a 
difference? And when? Not only is there an enormous amount of variety, 
change, and unknowability that is rendered static by the term "general orienta-
tion," but self-identification seems an unnecessarily simplistic way to think 
through how we understand our desires, preferences, and sexual choices, and it 
ignores the powerful effects of how others perceive us. Identities are not just 
lived and understood through our self~narrations, but through socialization, 
external identification, and interpellation. Ruth Colker's response to Glazer 
is the other way around. My argument for a classification system based on acts was a way to show the 
illogic and harms of our current sexual-identity classification scheme. 
31. EvE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET ( 1990). 
32. Mezey, supra note 8, at 99. 
33. Glazer, supra note 1, at 1002 (footnote omitted). 
34. As Ruth Colker rightly asks: 
Is there some point at which we stop giving weight to an individual's insistence that she is 
generally attracted to both men and women--despite a decade, or two decades, or a lifetime of 
an exclusive relationship with a man? What is the point of classifying a woman as a bisexual, 
merely based on her own feelings of general attraction towards men and women, if she is not 
genuinely open to acting on her feelings of attraction towards women? 
Colker, supra note 29, at 1077. 
35. See Rachel Luban, When a Cis Woman Dates a Trans Man, JEZEBEL (Dec. 17, 2010, 12:26 PM), 
http://uk.jezebel.com/datingrelationshipsgendersex ("We're both committed to having a queer relation-
ship; that is, one we make from scratch, considering our individual desires and needs, rather than what I 
think of as ticky-tacky relationships: they all look just the same."). According to the online Queer 
Dictionary, "A cisgender person is someone who identifies as [the] gender/sex they were assigned at 
birth." Cisgender (adj.), QUEER DICTIONARY (Aug. 22, 2011, 10:22 PM), http://queerdictionary.tumblr.com/ 
post/9264228131/cisgender-adj. 
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engages the issue of sexual socialization, and the way the sexual acts and 
identities we choose (and don't choose) are always partly the product of legal, 
cultural, and familial socialization. 36 The facts of socialization or any external 
influences on our identity choices may feel oppressive and limiting, but that 
doesn't mean they don't exist and that they don't render some identities more 
available and more likely than others. 
In addition, identities are also experienced and negotiated through the percep-
tions of others. Along some axes and in some circumstances, it may make 
perfect sense for me to identify as bisexual, but absent a cardboard sign, a 
scarlet letter, or an interrogation by the NAGAAA, I am also rightly perceived 
and treated as straight-by my extended family, by my children's friends and 
teachers, by doctors, waiters, colleagues, and students, and even by my own 
friends who know otherwise. It would feel absurd to continue to insist in each of 
these quotidian encounters that I am not what I seem, that despite my social 
existence and social privilege as a perceived straight person that my general 
orientation is "actually bi." What does it mean to be "actually bi" anyway, and 
on what basis should I insist on it? I don't want to deny my queerness, but 
neither do I want to insist on it despite the substantial evidence to the contrary. 
Neither feels right and nothing about a sexual reorientation offers an "out." 
Lastly, self-identification, socialization, and external identification are related 
to each other through interpellation, which complicates the very distinction 
between specific and general orientation. Louis Althusser used the concept of 
interpellation to explain the process by which ideology renders the abstract 
individual into an intelligible subject. 37 To wildly oversimplify, there is no 
self-understanding independent from socialization and external identification. 
All of our "individual" desires, preferences, and beliefs are partly the product of 
a complex process of ideological inculcation on the part of what Althusser 
inelegantly called "Ideological State Apparatuses," things like the media, fam-
ily, law, education, religion, etc.38 When we are "hailed" by another, we are 
made recognizable to ourselves; it "guarantee[s] for us that we are indeed 
concrete, individual, distinguishable and (naturally) irreplaceable subjects."39 
To analogize interpellation to the processes by which we are made specifically 
into sexual subjects, our sexual self-identification is always the product of both 
the categories available and the way we are hailed by others to fit within those 
categories. Therefore, we cannot entirely understand our general sexual orienta-
tion apart from our specific orientation. Our specific orientation influences the 
way we are hailed and constructed as sexual subjects by others, and the way we 
account for that sexual subjectivity is limited and influenced by the categories 
and social narratives available. For example, how can Sandy Stier account for 
36. Colker, supra note 29, at 1078-81. 
37. LoUis ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation), 
in LENIN AND PHILosoPHY AND OrnER EsSAYS 127, 170-77 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971). 
38. !d. at 143. 
39. /d. at 172-73. 
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her general orientation? The fact that she is in a long-term (presumably monoga-
mous) relationship with Kris Perry means that she is consistently interpellated 
as gay in much the same way that I am consistently interpellated as straight. It 
influences one's self-conception and "general" sexual identity to go through the 
world being recognized, reflected, and narrated in a particular way by friends 
and strangers alike. The default social script for Sandy Stier is indeed the one 
offered by her lawyers and prepackaged by the gay rights movement: she 
discovered her "true" and "authentic" sexual identity by falling in love with 
Kris Perry. In this way, even if she were inclined to claim a general orientation 
as a bisexual, such a choice is complicated by the social and political reality of 
her specific relationship and the way in which it interpellates her as gay. By not 
accounting for the complications of sexual-identity choice and the subtle pro-
cesses of socialization, external identification, and interpellation, Glazer's sexual 
reorientation can't begin to capture the complexities of lived identity and 
identification. 
Ill. DEATH OF THE BISEXUAL SABOTEUR 
To the extent that Glazer's legitimation project succeeds and the law recog-
nizes the harms that arise from a mismatch between one's general and specific 
orientations, this "success" would entail other failures, the most tragic of which 
is the failure of a less normative version of sexual identity.40 Glazer seeks to 
enrich and deepen our understanding of bisexuality, to show us how it can and 
should fit more easily within the LGBT cuddle puddle, and to create legal 
remedies for the victimization and discrimination bisexuals face at the hands of 
both gay and straight people. But Glazer's envisioned future of bisexual under-
standing and acceptance, however attractive to some bisexuals, is not a future in 
which the bisexual saboteur has a place. If the bisexual saboteur has a future, it 
is one in which the very discomfort and uncertainty the word-act-idea of 
bisexuality occasions is also its power to destablize, problematize, and undo the 
category of bisexuality and, with it, the other sexual-orientation categories as 
well. 
The bisexual saboteur I am thinking of is the excess of the hetero/homo 
regime.41 The bisexual saboteur is not all bisexuals, but those who find the 
40. See generally MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, PoLmcs, AND THE ETHICS OF 
QUEER LIFE (1999). Warner argues that the efforts of the gay and lesbian movement to be normalized 
require sanitizing homosexual identity by disentangling it from sex and the shame that sex always 
occasions. His argument is not just about identity, but also ethics. Embracing the "politics of normal ... 
merely throws shame on those who stand farther down the ladder of respectability." /d. at 60. 
41. See Leo Bersani, Sociality and Sexuality, 26 CRmcAL INQUIRY 641, 649 (2000) ("[Lack is] the 
precondition for metonymic excess-for all our productively mistaken desires for real objects and real 
people. Logically, there is no limit to this productivity, since the objects we pursue, while they trace the 
design of our individual desiring histories, are meant to recover that which preexists all object-choices, 
to 'repair,' not the anecdotal, anatomical castration of oedipal anxieties but, much more impressively, 
the ontological castration through which we presumably entered the human community of significa-
tion."). 
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prevailing options insufficiently descriptive of their sexual lives and desires, 
those who find "whatever" to be superior to the paucity of choices available. 
She is the embodiment of subversion, the spy, the betrayer, the unaccounted-for 
remainder produced by the enforcement of hetero/homo categorical coherence. 
The potential of the bisexual saboteur might be precisely that which gays and 
straights have always feared: she infiltrates and contaminates gay softball 
teams; she infiltrates and contaminates straight (and now gay) marriage; indeed, 
she has been infiltrating straight marriage since marriage began. But I think she 
is more than just the categorically transgressive sexual being that queers gays 
and straights alike. She might even be a way to "contest given categories and 
values by failing to relate to them either adaptively or transgressively."42 The 
bisexual saboteur is precisely that which cannot be normalized within sexual-
orientation categories because she renders those categories incoherent. 
In what I have said about lived identity, I have not focused on sexual identity 
as it is understood within the law,43 and in fairness to Glazer, this is her primary 
concern. Antidiscrimination law thrives on intelligible categories and relatively 
simple forms of harm. But with the benefit of simplicity comes the loss of 
complexity-complexity in our erotic lives, in the way we understand and 
organize our very subjectivity. Glazer's sexual reorientation has complicated 
sexual orientation just enough (and no more) to make it potentially intelligible 
to antidiscrimination law. The best that can come of that project is legal redress 
for some harms felt particularly by some bisexuals and those whose general and 
specific orientations (assuming we can easily identify them) diverge. This 
would provide to some bisexuals the protection and dignity that can come of 
understanding oneself as a rights holder. This is not insignificant, however 
aspirational it may be. 
But it is important to acknowledge the costs as well. One cost of this best 
possible outcome is the normalization of some conceptions of the bisexual, 
making a place in which she too can come within the fold of "domesticated 
liberty" alongside her fellow gay and lesbian rights holders.44 Based on what 
we know about the modern legitimation and integration project of homosexual-
ity, there is no reason to assume that the triumphs of recognition will radically 
disrupt the paradigm of essentialized sexual identity and open up new possibili-
ties for organizing our erotic lives. This cost falls on the Cuddle Puddle and 
those like them, who think there must be better options but whose own 
imaginations have no vocabulary with which to build them. The normalization 
42. See id. at 642 (emphasis omitted). 
43. Koppelman seems to imply that by elaborating on lived identity, I share Glazer's interest in 
trying to get the law to recognize sexual identity as it is actually lived. Koppelman, supra note 26, at 
1088. That is not my aim, yet neither do I sufficiently share Koppelman's confidence in, or commitment 
to, the private to say that "the way in which sexual orientation is actually lived is none of the law's 
business." /d. 
44. See Katherine M. Franke, Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1399 (2004). 
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of the bisexual within the law is the loss of her potential as the agent of creative 
sabotage of our current categories of sexual subjectivity. The death of the 
bisexual saboteur makes it less likely that we will soon emerge into a future that 
enables a "different economy of bodies and pleasures"45 less enslaved to our 
impoverished understandings of sex and gender. 
45. MICHEL FoucAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VoLUME 1: AN lNTRooucnoN 159 (Robert Hurley 
trans., Vintage Books 1980) (1978). 
